<Special Feature "Gulf Studies in Japan: New Trend, Perspective, and Approach">Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States : Preliminary Analysis of Recent Labor Market by MATSUO, Masaki
Title
<Special Feature "Gulf Studies in Japan: New Trend,
Perspective, and Approach">Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf
States : Preliminary Analysis of Recent Labor Market
Author(s)MATSUO, Masaki








Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States
Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States*: Preliminary Analysis of Recent Labor Market
MATSUO Masaki**
Introduction
Longva called in her article Kuwaiti society “civic ethnocracy” [Longva 2005]. According 
to her, non-citizen laborers’ lack of security is a problem common all over the world, but in 
Kuwait, because the number of non-citizens is huge, this leads to the creation of a political 
structure with ethnocratic features; huge numbers of non-Kuwaiti laborers are subject to small 
numbers of Kuwaitis. Discussions around ethnocracy were concentrated on affairs regarding 
disparities between different ethnic groups with the same nationality, although, in the era of 
labor that are highly mobilized internationally, ethnocracy could be applied to the problems 
deriving from disparities between nationals and immigrants within one state.
As Longva mentioned, inequality between nationals and foreigners are common all over 
the world. Not only in non-democratic countries but also in the countries of Western Europe 
recognized as democratic, disparities between two groups are found especially in differentials 
of wage and/or fields of jobs. As Balibar & Wallerstein discussed, employing immigrant labor 
for low wages is a kind of neo-colonialism [Balibar & Wallerstein 1991], i.e. immigrant labor 
is a colony created in a developed country. Democratic countries in Western Europe while 
extolling their protection of human rights and equal rights of citizens, have been sustained by 
the exploitation of immigrant labor. Although problems of exploitation of immigrant labor 
were regarded as something outside of a nation state, now it should be explained as an affair 
which constitutes an economic, social and political system of one nation-state.
Such arguments as above mentioned in Western Europe around the disparities of 
nationals and immigrant labor could be extended to the labor market of the Arab Gulf States 
which have huge numbers of immigrant labor and continue to attract them. In this region, 
immigrant labor has special roles to sustain their society.
Internal colonialism (cultural division of labor), split labor market
On studying problems deriving from existence of groups with wage differentials 
corresponding to the origin of groups within a single labor market, there are two well known 
theories, i.e. the internal colonialism (and another version of it, cultural division of labor) 
of M. Hechter and the split labor market of E. Bonacichi. Hechter explained the process of 
generating ethnic groups within one nation as a result of the spatial and cultural disequilibrium 
of economic development which stimulates exploited groups to unite as ethnic groups [Hechter 
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1975; 1978]. And Bonacichi explained the emergence of ethnic antagonism as resulting from 
wage differentials between ethnic groups; immigrant labor bear low wages (because it is high 
comparing to countries of their origins and they don’t want to reside in host countries for 
long), then employers tend to promote hiring them and main national labor want to prevent 
it; as a result, conflicts emerge between these three groups which lead to ethnic problems 
[Bonacichi 1972; 1975; 1976]. Both theories have a common feature regarding the generation 
of ethnic groups as not emotional or absurd, but rational.
Also, we can find points of difference between the two. The most important of them here 
is the status of groups earning lower wages. While Hechter discussed differentials between 
developed and underdeveloped groups within one nation, Bonacichi dealt with groups of 
laborers classifiable into national and immigrant/imported labor. According to Hechter, labor 
with lower wages on the Celtic fringes could be categorized into certain ethnic group such as 
Celts, and also into British nationals at the same time (that’s why this could be problematized 
as an “internal” colony). Bonacichi, on the other hand, premised that wage differentials 
derive from immigrants’ motives that are very different from national labor, i.e. motives of 
temporary labor; not only can they bear undesirable work but they also have little reason to 
join unions to engage in lengthy conflict to get higher wages because they are temporary 
labor.
This difference between Hechter and Bonacichi, problems of labor of the same 
nationality, and problems of nationals and imported groups, would prevent us from easily 
applying these two theories at one time. Internal colonialism is a matter of inequality within 
one nation and this implies that this should be solved to create equality. Conflict between 
national labor and imported labor should also be solved, but centrally so as not to create 
equality between nationals and imported labor but to limit the use of imported labor, or, to 
keep the split labor market to protect national labor.
This difference is similar to the difference between the discussion of ethnocracy and 
immigrant labor in the introduction. And, as we confirmed in the introduction that ethnocracy 
as a frame of study could be applied to the study of exploiting immigrant labor, both internal 
colonialism and the split labor market theory could be applied to the study of the labor market 
of the Arab Gulf States. 
Labor market in the Arab Gulf States
According to the split labor market theory, some processes appear after the import of labor:
● nationals are challenged by imported labor because the latter have more wage 
competitiveness than the former and conflict emerges between nationals (especially 
with low wages) and imported labor;
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● nationals with low wages stand against imported labor demanding that the 
government limits them in number or their fields of employment;
● if national labor with low wages have more influence than employers who want to 
use imported labor, a limitation act will be approved, and if not, national labor will 
lose and the conflict will continue;
● if nationals and imported labor should make a joint front to demand a raise in wages, 
employers can import another labor from abroad and use them as strike breakers.
In the Arab Gulf States at present there is no such action by nationals as listed above. Why 
don’t nationals protest against employers or the government? To solve this question, we have 
to explore the labor markets in the Arab Gulf States.
At first, we have to pay attention to the drive of the economy in the Arab Gulf States, oil. 
The economic prosperity of the Arab Gulf States attracts huge numbers of labor from abroad 
and this prosperity stands on oil exportation. Although, even before oil, there were immigrant 
labor in the Arab Gulf States, their number was small. After oil exportation started around 
the 1940’s to 50’s an economic boom came and these states suffered from a shortage of labor. 
Then, importation of labor inevitably started. 
During the first few decades, a split labor market favorable to nationals did not exist. 
Although the rulers of the Arab Gulf States were eager to promote international oil companies 
to hire their subjects, many labor were imported from abroad because there were few skilled 
or educated national labor in these countries [Seccombe & Lawless 1986]. According to 
Louër, who studied labor immigration in Bahrain, “Most of the Bahrainis worked on a daily 
non-contract basis” during 1930’s to 1960’s, and this “led to the creation of a trade union, 
the Bahrain Labor Federation (October 1955) with 6000 members, and to the drafting of 
labor legislation subsequently submitted to the rulers” [Louër 2008: 35]. This incident clearly 
suggests that Bonacichi’s discussion could be well applied to the Arab Gulf States, at least at 
the first stage of oil economy. But, in the following decades, they continued to import labor 
from abroad, until now. Why were labor movements calmed down without governments’ 
altering the labor-import policy? And why is there no labor action from nationals protesting 
against this policy?
Table 1 shows the answer to these questions. In Kuwait, the number of employed 
Kuwaitis has grown from 23,924 in 1966 to 206,960 in 2005 and “expatriates” also grew from 
54,960 in 1966 to 1,402,154. In 1966, 58% of total Kuwaiti labor were working in the public 
sector, and in 2005 it jumped to 81.6%. During same period, the percentage of “expatriates” 
working in the public sector decreased from 25.5% to 4.1%. This statistical analysis clearly 
indicates that most Kuwaiti labor newly entered into the labor market after finishing required 
education were absorbed into the public sector, while “expatriates” were placed in the private 
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sector. As Kapizsewski explained, in the Arab Gulf States, national labor working in the 
public sector enjoy high wages compared to the private sector, and are provided with pensions 
and prestige as if they are “labor aristocracy” [Kapizsewski 2001: 17].
Table 1: Labor market of Kuwait (from 1966 to 2005, Kuwaitis, Expatriates, Public sector)
1966 1975 1985 1995 2005
Total number of employed Kuwaitis 23,924 91,844 95,812 142,204 206,960
Total number of employed expatriates 54,960 211,444 566,240 603,497 1,402,154
Public sector Kuwaitis 14,290 43,340 53,283 134,196 168,974Expatriates 14,051 51,290 82,770 90,481 57,537
Ratio of Kuwaitis in public sector 58.0 47.1 55.6 94.3 81.6
Ratio of expatriates in public sector 25.5 24.2 14.6 14.9 4.1
Source: Ministry of Planning (Kuwait), 1996, 2008.
As long as a government can supply national labor with well paid jobs, and the speed of 
economic growth of the state can exceed (or at least keep up with) the growth of the national 
labor force, conflict between nationals and immigrants in a labor market may not occur. In the 
Arab Gulf States the Profit from oil export enables this. The expansion of the public sector 
absorbs national labor and increases their disposable income which they invest into the private 
sector, in which “expatriates” are hired for low wages. Although during the first few decades 
of the oil economy, national labor received less pay than skilled immigrant labor and this led 
to labor movements, an upper shift of most of national labor emerged as a result of allocating 
the profit of oil exports through jobs in the public sector and this led to the cessation of labor 
movements.
Nationals occupying small portion of total number of residents enjoy life in a welfare 
state and immigrant labor constituting huge part of residents in number (from around 25% in 
Oman to 80% in the UAE) serves nationals as low wage labor. It cannot be overstated that 
the private sector of the Arab Gulf States cannot function without immigrant labor, because 
the private sector comprises most of the activities which compose a society. Immigrant labor 
are just like a group living in an internal colony artificially created by oil profit; they are 
imported for national benefit as subjects to be exploited. Hechter referred to the probability of 
the transformation of the feeling of deprivedness of a group which is culturally distinctive and 
in a low position in the stratification system into an ethnic identity [Hechter 1978: 298–299], 
and this is the very central point of his “cultural division of labor” theory which explains the 
creation of ethnic groupings. But in the Arab Gulf States this explanation is made inversely. 
Feelings of the privilegedness of an indigenous group will be transformed into a national 
consciousness. This is what Longva called the “civic ethnocracy” of the Arab Gulf States 
which divides residents into ruling and ruled, rich and exploited, along with citizenship and 
making nationals think themselves empowered.
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Future of Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States
Because of the huge oil and gas reserve and the small population of nationals, Kuwait, the UAE, 
and Qatar will keep their ethnocracy for some decades. Conversely, Bahrain and Oman have 
obstacles to continuing it, because their oil and gas reserve is limited and/or its population is 
relatively large. Regarding Bahrain, as Louër discussed, “(t)he current Bahraini labor market 
is very similar to the situations described by Edna Bonacich as a ‘split labor market’ ” [Louër 
2008:44]. There is a tension between nationals and immigrant laborers. In Oman, though the 
young generation is waiting for jobs, the expansion of the public sector is coming to an end 
while dependence on immigrant laborers does not end [Wincker 2000]. Where will these 
symptoms for labor unrest lead these two countries? According to Bonacichi, there are some 
options; one is a conflict between national and immigrant labor, and/or between nationals 
and employers, and the other is the protest of nationals against their government’s policy on 
immigrant labor. In these cases, it is important who the employers are and where the protests 
lead.
According to Looney, the low income group is constituted of rural Shia residents, while 
merchants and the Sunni ruling elites (i.e. ruling family and groups with close relations to 
it) are earning profit by using immigrant labor [Looney 1990: 171–2]. This implies that it is 
difficult for Bahrain to alter its labor importation policy because proponents of this policy are 
ruling elites who constitute of its government. So, when the advantages in the labor market 
disappear for some nationals, a low income group of nationals (i.e. rural Shia) will protest 
against government and employers of immigrant laborers (i.e. mostly urban Sunna), this 
protest leads to an anti-regime movement with an appearance of ethnic/religious conflict (i.e. 
Shia versus Sunna).
As to Oman, different from Bahrain, its regime is not “dynastic monarchy” in which 
royal family rules as a group rather “monarchy” in which a ruler (Sultan Qabus) rules alone, 
no strong ruling elites appear and the coincidence of the rulings and proponents of the labor 
importation policy is not found. Also in Oman, the ethnic composition is more complex than 
Bahrain for there are some ethnic groups such as Zanzibari, Ibadhi, Sunni, Shia and Hindu. 
In Oman no conflict between ethnic groups and the ruling and the ruled have been reported 
since the launch of Qabus regime that has ruled until now, this is because the ethnic diversity 
of nationals prevents from emerging “cultural division of labor” as in Bahrain. So it could be 
forecast that the government of Oman can alter the labor importation policy slowly and the 
ethnocracy will dissolve relatively in peace.
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